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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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18 APRIL 1973

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# **TRENDS**


**in Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

18 APRIL 1973

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 APRIL 1973

<u>Moscow (2652 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1301 items)</u>		
Vietnam	(8%)	7%	Domestic Issues	(49%)	37%
[Xuan Thuy in USSR	(--)	3%]	Cambodia	(5%)	23%
[Solidarity Month	(1%)	3%]	[Sihanouk's Travels	(2%)	18%]
Israeli Attack on	(-)	5%	Korea	(1%)	11%
Lebanon			[DPRK Supreme	(1%)	7%]
China	(3%)	5%	People's Assembly		
Mexican President	(--)	4%	Meeting		
Echeverria in USSR			UN Seabed Meetings,	(9%)	6%
Cosmonauts Day	(--)	4%	Superpower "Maritime		
European Security	(1%)	3%	Hegemony"		
			Israeli Attack on Lebanon	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

With hostilities continuing in South Vietnam as well as in Cambodia and Laos, Hanoi and the PRG made a dramatic move to focus international attention on their versions of the present situation by sending notes to the participants of the 12-nation international conference. The notes rehashed long-standing allegations regarding U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace accord and called on the conferees to urge compliance with the accord and to condemn violations of it. Commenting on the DRV note, an 18 April NHAN DAN editorial observed that it was "necessary and timely" and cited in this regard both the South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia and the renewed B-52 strikes in Laos.

The reported 15 April incursion into Cambodia by ARVN forces prompted protests by DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen on the 17th as well as a statement by Sihanouk's government. They charged that the incursion resulted from a U.S. decision taken in the wake of General Haig's trip to Southeast Asia. A 14 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting U.S. bombing in Cambodia had taken critical note of Haig's tour and cited "Western sources" for the report that the United States planned to send Saigon troops to save the Phnom Penh regime.

The renewed U.S. B-52 strikes in Laos on 16 April were also promptly denounced by the Pathet Lao that day and in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 17th. The statement gratuitously cited Western reports that the bombing had been ordered by President Nixon and "requested" by the Lao Government.

### PRG, DRV APPEAL TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

It is not clear why the DRV and the PRG took the initiative at this time in formally presenting their case regarding the implementation of the peace accord to the UN Secretary General and the countries which participated in the 12-nation international conference in Paris. The timing may have been influenced by a belief that some new allied action was likely in the wake of General Haig's Southeast Asia tour and that international opinion might best be mobilized at this juncture.

The PRG's communication to the conferees was called a government "memorandum" (bi vong lucj), dated the 14th and carried by Front media on the 18th. Hanoi's was labeled a foreign ministry

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"note" (coong hamf), dated and released on the 16th. Both documents repeated long-standing charges against Washington and Saigon, claiming in standard fashion that they have "brazenly and systematically" violated many basic provisions of the peace agreement and that the United States has not ended its military involvement and interference in South Vietnam and is still trying to carry out "neocolonialism." The documents both also warned that the "violations" jeopardize the implementation of the peace agreement and pose a threat to peace.\*

The PRG memorandum was the more detailed of the two in its indictment of Saigon and the United States, among other things charging that Saigon had committed some 67,762 acts in violation of the cease-fire during the first two months it was in effect. The memorandum also reiterated PRG complaints that the GVN has deadlocked the two-party consultations in Paris by its demands for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and that it has claimed to be the only legal government, denying the existence of the PRG and third forces. Like an earlier 1 April PRG Government statement, the memorandum maintained that the PRG is the "authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people but did not claim that it is the "only" representative.\*\*

Charges against the United States in the PRG and DRV documents included the usual claims that U.S. arms, bases, and disguised military personnel have been illegally left behind in South Vietnam; that war materials are being shipped into South Vietnam in violation of the peace accord; and that the United States has delayed mine-clearing operations in North Vietnamese waters. The PRG memorandum also scored the United States for "threatening to use force" against the DRV, and it went beyond the DRV note in demanding that the United States "assume the responsibility of making the GVN strictly implement the agreement."

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\* Article 6 of the act of the international conference provides for such communications with the participants, stipulating that "the four parties to the agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties may, either individually or through joint action, inform the other parties to this act about the implementation of the agreement and protocols."

\*\* The claim to be the only representative was pressed recently in PRG accounts of communiques on PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's visits to the USSR and Mongolia. See the TRENDS of 11 April 1973, pages 8-9.

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Both the PRG and the DRV notes went beyond earlier propaganda, however, in suggesting that there was a private understanding with the United States on the question of the release of civilian prisoners held by the GVN. A 1 March NHAN DAN editorial had said that the United States had made "private commitments on a number of problems," but it had not indicated the nature of the problems.\* The DRV note merely said that Saigon's failure to release prisoners was at variance with a U.S. "pledge" in this regard. But the PRG memorandum went into detail, claiming that the GVN's failure to release any civilian prisoners "is at variance with the commitment of the U.S. Government to the effect that the majority of Vietnamese civilian personnel should be returned within 60 days and all the Vietnamese civilian personnel returned within 90 days." The only known instance in which the media had previously mentioned this time frame was in a 29 March NHAN DAN editorial which claimed, erroneously, that the peace accord stipulated that the "majority" of the civilian prisoners were to be released in the first two months.\*\*

Both the PRG and the DRV routinely reaffirmed that they respect and are implementing the Paris peace agreement, and both concluded with an appeal for the governments which participated in the international conference to condemn alleged U.S. and GVN violations and demand that the two governments strictly implement the Paris accord and the act of the international conference.

Neither Moscow nor Peking has responded to the two documents, although Soviet media have reported both and NCNA has carried the text of the DRV note and presumably will carry the PRG memorandum, which was not released by the Front until the 18th.

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\* See the TRENDS of 7 March 1973, page 2.

\*\* The Paris agreement merely indicates that the question of detained Vietnamese civilian personnel will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties and that they will "do their utmost to resolve this question within 90 days after the cease-fire comes into effect."

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# CANADIAN ON ICCS SCORED FOR REMARKS ABOUT DRV TROOPS IN SOUTH

In a departure from their past circumspection regarding the ICCS, Vietnamese communist media directly criticized Canadian chief delegate Gauvin for remarks he made at a 13 April ICCS meeting in connection with the investigation of the 7 April incident in which an ICCS helicopter was downed. However, the criticism was not extended to the Canadian Government, and the communists made a point of contrasting Gauvin's "incorrect" attitude regarding the crash--in which nine men were killed--with External Affairs Minister Sharp's acceptance of the communist stand that the helicopter was off course.\*

The communists obviously were concerned to counter Gauvin's remarks implying that there are North Vietnamese troops in the South who have no right to be there and that they are engaged in activity that violates the terms of the peace agreement. Thus, comment, including radio commentaries on the 14th and articles in the Hanoi press on the 15th and the 17th, focused on Gauvin's remark that it is possible that the helicopter incident was caused by "troops whose presence in South Vietnam is not provided for in the Paris agreement."\*\* An article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 15th typified comment when it responded that the peace agreement stipulated only that U.S. and allied foreign troops could not be present in South Vietnam. The article went on with a cryptic criticism of Gauvin for "linking" the helicopter incident with the question of missile emplacements in Khe Sanh. But it obscured the exact nature of his remarks in which he said that in view of the area in which the craft was downed, it was ironic that the ICCS had been frustrated in its

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\* The U.S. and GVN charges that the helicopter had been shot down were first acknowledged in a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 11th which labeled these charges "false accusations" and said that the "mishap" was caused by the helicopter's deviation from course. See the TRENDS of 11 April 1973, page 12.

\*\* Gauvin did not explicitly charge that there had been recent DRV infiltration. The peace agreement implicitly acknowledges that North Vietnamese troops will initially remain in the South in Chapter IV, Article 13 which says: "The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties . . . . Among questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced."

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earlier attempts to investigate the alleged existence of SAM's at nearby Khe Sarh. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN concluded by expressing the hope that Gauvin would adopt an "objective" attitude so that he could make a positive contribution to the maintenance of peace.

Another, unidentified, statement by Gauvin allegedly made on the 15th was promptly assailed the next day by Liberation Radio and on the 17th by NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The comment scored Gauvin for raising the possibility that the wreckage of the helicopter might have been moved and for suggesting that the passengers on the second accompanying helicopter had been compelled to sign a report on the circumstances of the incident. The Liberation Radio broadcast, in line with some earlier radio comment, noted that Gauvin apparently did not realize that "his thoughtless deed undermined the status of the ICCS." NHAN DAN did not raise any suggestion that the status of the ICCS was jeopardized, but did claim that Gauvin's remarks were "contrary to the duty of an ICCS member." Paralleling the earlier army paper article, NHAN DAN concluded with a positive note, however, expressing the hope that Gauvin would adopt a "correct attitude" as required by his duties.

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#### NLHS, HANOI PROTEST RENEWED U.S. B-52 STRIKES IN LAOS

The Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) responded to the 16 April resumption of U.S. bombing in Laos with a Central Committee statement on the 17th maintaining that the raids "gravely and ferociously destroy" the 21 February Vientiane cease-fire agreement and constitute "very brazen, bellicose acts which are part of the U.S. scheme of systematically sabotaging" the agreement. Asserting that the bombing presented "a very serious threat to peace," it warned that the United States and "the Vientiane side" would be held "responsible for all the consequences arising from their frantic acts of adventure" and "resolutely" demanded that the raids be ended.

The air strikes were also protested in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 17th which called the U.S. action "a new military escalation of an extremely serious character" and a "brazen violation" of both the Vientiane and Paris agreements. The statement gratuitously cited Western reports that the bombing had been ordered by President Nixon and "requested" by the Vientiane government. It asserted that the DRV Government "strongly condemns" the United States and "firmly demands" that it respect the agreements and end the bombing immediately. While the NLHS statement contended that the United States and Vientiane "have colluded" to prolong the negotiations in Vientiane to avoid a settlement, the DRV statement took a stronger anti-U.S. stance by saying the United States "has pressured" Vientiane into procrastinating in the talks.

NCNA to date has reported only an initial PATHET LAO NEWS AGENCY item accusing the United States of committing "a new grave crime" that constitutes "a brazen violation" of the Vientiane agreement. TASS has carried a brief report on the DRV Foreign Ministry statement, centering on those portions describing the raids as "a flagrant violation" of the accords and demanding that the United States end its bombing and "other criminal acts of war in Laos." Earlier a brief TASS item had quoted Western news agencies on the raids.

#### RGNU, DRV, PRG DENOUNCE ARVN INCURSION INTO CAMBODIA

The reported incursion of Saigon forces into Cambodia early this week triggered a 17 April RGNU Government statement, carried in full by NCNA, and DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman statements

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on the same day. After condemning "intensified" U.S. bombing over Cambodia during the past 40 days, the RGNU statement charged that the Saigon "invasion" on 15 April had been carried out as a result of a U.S. decision. It alleged that President Nixon and the National Security Council, in the wake of General Haig's tour of Southeast Asia, had decided to send Saigon and Thai troops into Cambodia under U.S. air cover so as to shore up the Phnom Penh government. Claiming that this escalation has exposed President Nixon's "diabolical design" to reactivate the Indochina war, the statement routinely pledged continued resistance and appealed to world opinion to halt the American actions.

The DRV and PRG statements were largely confined to standard charges, claiming that the incursion was inspired by Washington, that it represents a violation of the Paris agreement and the act of the international conference on Vietnam, and that the United States and Saigon must bear full responsibility for their actions. Both statements noted that the ARVN had also encroached on PRG-controlled areas of South Vietnam, and the PRG rebutted allied charges concerning Vietnamese communist infiltration in Cambodia. The PRG uniquely declared that the ARVN incursions had taken place on the 16th as well as on the 15th, and it demanded that Saigon must "withdraw at once its troops back to their positions, and stop all their illegal encroachments on PRG-controlled areas."

Earlier, on 14 April, the DRV had released a higher-level foreign ministry statement pegged to continued U.S. bombing and material support for Lon Nol that took critical note of General Haig's tour and cited "Western reports" that the United States planned to send Saigon troops to save the Phnom Penh government. NCNA duly picked up this statement but dropped references to Haig's trip and the planned use of Saigon troops. Peking has thus far not commented on the alleged ARVN incursion and has yet to pick up the two Vietnamese spokesman statements. Soviet coverage has been restricted to low-level reports and truncated pickups of the Vietnamese protests.

#### SIHANOUK PUBLICIZES RESULTS OF RECENT TRIP TO CAMBODIA

Prince Sihanouk has engaged in a busy round of activities in an effort to realize the greatest possible impact internationally from his trip to "the liberated zone" of Cambodia. His triumphant return to Peking on 11 April was followed the next day by a

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banquet hosted by Chou En-lai and then by a Khmer New Year's reception on the 13th, after which Sihanouk gave a two and a half hour press conference to further publicize the results of his tour. He proceeded to North Korea on the 14th to make use of yet another forum to appeal for world support in his campaign to isolate the Lon Nol regime diplomatically in tandem with the military pressure being applied by the FUNK forces at home.

Sihanouk's 6-11 April stay in North Vietnam, which occasioned professions of solidarity and mutual support, failed to produce a joint communique, unlike all of his previous visits there since his overthrow. The two sides may have regarded his DRV visit this time as being only incidental to his trip into Cambodia and thus not calling for a joint communique. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th discussed only his tour of "the liberated zone" of Cambodia and made no mention of his stay in Hanoi. The editorial hailed his tour as a "common success of all the three Indochinese countries" and a proof of their "close militant solidarity." NHAN DAN reaffirmed Hanoi's determination to discharge its obligation to the FUNK and to support Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration.

Peking highlighted its support for Sihanouk through a major leadership turnout at Chou's banquet that included all the active Peking-based Politburo members except Mao's wife. Chou used the occasion both to laud Sihanouk as "an outstanding patriot" who has made "remarkable contributions" to the Cambodian cause and to offer his most comprehensive assessment of the Indochina situation in over two months. Chou followed the relaxed line set forth in the 3 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in observing that "some important provisions" of the Paris agreement have been implemented while mildly rebuking Saigon, "supported by the United States," for allegedly placing obstacles in the way of implementation of the agreement. However, in keeping with Peking's support for Sihanouk and its interest in major power disengagement from Indochina, Chou proceeded to "strongly condemn" the United States for its bombing in Cambodia and its support for Lon Nol. Chou pointedly charged that by these actions the United States is "seriously contravening" the Paris agreement and "its own promise" at the Paris international conference.

Similarly, in his comments on a Cambodian settlement Chou focused on the U.S. role while ignoring relations among the Cambodian adversaries. Significantly, instead of Sihanouk's five-point declaration Chou chose to quote from a statement made by Sihanouk

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In February at a time when the prince was taking a relatively flexible line on a settlement. Chou quoted Sihanouk as saying that the problem of peace in Cambodia is not difficult to solve and that peace would be restored if the United States agreed to stop interfering. Declaring support for "this just stand," Chou demanded that the United States end its bombing and interference in Cambodia.

**SIHANOUK STATEMENTS** In contrast to Chou's carefully balanced statement of Chinese policy, Sihanouk took the occasion to denounce President Nixon as being "super-belligerent and super-colonialist," to refer darkly to General Haig's recent trip to Southeast Asia (about which Peking has remained discreetly silent), and to warn that the President may drive all of Southeast Asia into flames and thus endanger world peace. According to Sihanouk, the "only one adequate solution" to the Cambodian question would be for the United States to leave the Phnom Penh regime "to sort things out all alone, without any U.S. military aid, face to face" with the FUNK. He expressed confidence that the Lon Nol regime would collapse at once without U.S. air support.

In his press conference on 13 April Sihanouk underscored the FUNK's tough negotiating stance by stressing that it will never accept a cease-fire or compromise. Recalling that two months ago he had vainly sought to make contact with the United States to discuss a settlement, Sihanouk explained that only an end to U.S. involvement can be a subject of negotiation, not a cease-fire. This uncompromising position has also been reflected in recent pronouncements by Sihanouk's Prime Minister Penn Nouth and the in-country ministers flatly demanding the overthrow of Lon Nol before peace can be achieved.

Also at his press conference Sihanouk linked the FUNK's cause with that of the third world generally, a theme which he developed in a long speech in Pyongyang on the 16th, and praised many African countries for recognizing his government--an anticipation of his projected tour of Africa next month. Among his appeals for diplomatic support he made a pitch--in a tone more of resignation than of optimism--to the Soviets to "end their commitment" to Phnom Penh. "We do not want to be their enemies and we are very sad that they do not like us," Sihanouk was quoted by NCNA as saying. In the past Sihanouk had directed sharp barbs at the Soviets, though not by name, for engaging in "dishonorable political and diplomatic maneuvering" in contrast to "true friends" who have recognized Sihanouk's government.

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## NLHS DELEGATION ON TOUR TO DRV, CHINA, "OTHER COUNTRIES"

Member of the NLHS Standing Committee Nouthak Phoumsavan, at the head of a delegation including two NLHS Central Committee members, has left Sam Neua on what appears to be a repeat of the aid-seeking trip an NLHS delegation made to North Vietnam, China, the USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia from late June to late August last year.\* The delegation arrived in Hanoi on 13 April with only a one-day advance announcement by Hanoi and no advance treatment by Pathet Lao media. Not until the delegation left Hanoi on 16 April did VNA report that the delegation was also visiting "other friendly countries." NCNA on the same day announced the arrival of the delegation in Peking.

The composition of the delegation is similar to the one last year: Nouthak has been the leader of both six-member groups. The number two man has been a member of the NLHS Central Committee; last year he was Thao Mun and this year Sisana Sisane. Khamphay Boupha, another Central Committee member, is again listed third. As last year, the delegation includes a representative of the logistics department of the Lao People's Liberation Army Supreme Command. This year's delegation also includes a representative of the Planning Commission of the NLHS Central Committee.

The pattern of the delegation's activities and the functions of individuals meeting the delegation in Hanoi and Peking are much the same as they were last year. North Vietnamese and Chinese vice premiers Nguyen Duy Trinh and Li Hsien-nien were the ranking hosts to the delegations in both years, and many of the other officials were present on both occasions. Although the purpose of the present tour has not been made clear, the positions of some of the officials indicate that aid is a major topic of discussion. Visiting North Vietnam at the invitation of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the DRV Government, the delegation members were received by President Ton Duc Thang, party chief Le Duan, National Assembly Chairman Truong Chinh, and Premier Pham Van Dong. Last year the delegation was received by all these leaders except Truong Chinh.

The joint communique issued in Hanoi on 16 April reveals little on the subjects discussed during the visit, which were described as "the current struggle of the Vietnamese and Lao peoples" and "the relations of friendly co-operation between the two countries." The

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\* The trip last year is reviewed in the TRENDS of July 1972, pages 21-22, and 30 August 1972, pages 23-26.

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two sides "reached unity of views" on all questions brought up for discussion, according to the communique. The North Vietnamese accepted an invitation to send "a highranking delegation" to Laos "for a friendship visit."

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## CHINA

## TENG HSIAC-PING'S RETURN MAY SIGNAL FURTHER REHABILITATIONS

The reappearance of Teng Hsiao-ping on 12 April at a banquet for Prince Sihanouk provides dramatic testimony to the extent of the campaign to rehabilitate leaders disgraced during the cultural revolution and may signal a new stage in rebuilding the Chinese leadership. Teng, who as party secretary general was the target of attack during the cultural revolution as "the other top party person taking the capitalist road," had been spared official denunciation by name\* and thus remained in the category of cadres who could be rehabilitated through a process of confession and rectification. His rehabilitation after Lin Piao's fall suggests that his support came from Chou En-lai, and in fact he reappeared in his old position of vice premier under Chou but without a party title.\*\*

Teng's reappearance may have been decided at a high-level conference apparently held in mid-March, though it had been rumored for some time that he headed a group of former leaders slated for rehabilitation. If major decisions were made at such a conference, Teng's return may herald the rehabilitation of other victims of the cultural revolution and pave the way for the reconstitution of the top leadership to fill the vacancies created by the purge of Lin and his associates. That Teng is returning to an active role is suggested by a second appearance, on the 15th, when he joined Chou's most active deputy, Li Hsien-nien, in seeing off a Chinese delegation to Japan. Three other vice premiers--Li Fu-chun, Nieh Jung-chen, and Chen Yun--have been relatively inactive.

RED FLAG ARTICLE      Teng Hsiao-ping's return coincides with the appearance in the latest issue of the theoretical journal RED FLAG (No. 4, 1973) of an article explaining the policy of rehabilitation and attempting to allay the uncertainty and indecision among cadres shaken by the

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\* Teng was of course reviled by the Red Guards and was cited in a few provincial references to the "Liu-Teng line."

\*\* In another sign of the premier's power, Chou's wife was listed among the leaders at the 12 April banquet in a group of three central committee members immediately following the Politburo members.

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successive purges. The article, broadcast by the Hefei radio on the day after Teng's resurfacing but not yet heard over Radio Peking, uses the technique of an exegesis of a canonical Mao work--his 1948 "Talk to the Editorial Staff of the SHANSI-SUIYUAN DAILY"--for an authoritative exposition of policy on a sensitive issue. According to the article, "anyone who has committed errors should be warmly welcomed, provided he is willing to turn over a new leaf after making a clean breast to the party, clarifying his problems, and criticizing himself." Under such conditions he should be helped to "continue the revolution and serve the people."

A reading of Mao's published talk shows its relevance to the current scene in China. In his talk Mao noted that a campaign to correct left deviations had recently been launched and that there had been a struggle against right deviations before that. Mao observed that the SHANSI-SUIYUAN DAILY had been marked by a "sharp, pungent, and vigorous" style during the antirightist phase but that during the antileftist campaign it had lost its appeal. Mao's concern at that time could be updated in the present conditions as dissatisfaction at the top over the failure of timid cadres to exercise vigorous leadership in the wake of the zigzag turns of events in recent years. Drawing on Mao's authority to reassure hesitant cadres, the RED FLAG article asserts that left and right deviations are to be expected and are "entirely different from opportunism."

Recent treatment of the cultural revolution has seemed designed to brake the trend, gathering steam since the fall of Lin Biao and Chen Po-ta, to negate achievements of the cultural revolution. Thus, around the turn of the year Lin was redesignated an "ultrarightist" who only made use of leftist forms, and cultural revolution achievements were mentioned in a favorable context. The RED FLAG article picks up Mao's warning against abandoning the achievements of past struggle, noting that Liu Shao-chi and his like "negated the cultural revolution and denied our nation's great achievements in revolution and construction during the past decades." The article treats left and right deviations by "comrades" as rectifiable mistakes. Deviations are seen as the result of cadres not being good "at pursuing the party's mass line or at explaining the party's tasks and general and specific policies to the masses." Right deviations occur when the cadres lag behind the "awakening of the masses" and left deviations when "they go beyond the limits prescribed by objective developments and by the comprehension of

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the masses," but "it is entirely wrong to confuse these problems with the revisionist line of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi." Even with regard to those who have been in the "enemy" ranks, presumably including those such as Teng, the article calls for leniency toward those who confess their crimes in order to "isolate to the maximum extent . . . the handful of most stubborn enemies." By "severe punishment" of the worst enemies, others will be induced "to turn over a new leaf."

The RED FLAG article provides a conceptual framework for understanding shifts in line by interpreting them as reflections of Mao's policy of "alternating tension with relaxation." The article reiterates Mao's warning that during periods of tension "we must act carefully and not pull the bowstring too tight" and during times of relaxation "we must not relax our vigilance or efforts." This line serves to assure cadres and the masses that there is a logic to events and that the central leadership has events well in hand.

#### NEW KWEICHOW LEADERS APPEAR, PROVINCES TRADE SECRETARIES

Though overshadowed by the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping, a number of provincial leaders have reappeared in recent weeks, highlighted by the first appearance of top Kweichow leaders since the purge of Lin Biao. The Kweichow appearances seem to confirm rumors that the top two local leaders, first secretary Lan I-nung and secretary Chang Jung-sen, have been purged. The Kweichow radio on 16 April reported that leaders turning out to meet **Tachai model production brigade secretary included Lu Jui-lin**, formerly a party secretary in Yunnan and also a deputy commander of the Kunming Military Region, who had made no public appearances since Lin's fall; Kuo Chao, apparently a rehabilitated former party secretary and vice governor in Yunnan prior to the cultural revolution; as well as Kweichow deputy secretaries Ho Kuang-yu and Chia Ting-san, and Kweichow party standing committee member Lo Hsi-kang, a revolutionary worker who rose in the cultural revolution.

Other recently revealed changes include the transfer back to Hunan of former first secretary Chang Ping-hua as a secretary. Chang, who went with Tao Chu to the central party Propaganda Department in 1966, was later rehabilitated and was serving as a Shansi secretary as recently as late February. Chang's rehabilitation thus follows a pattern established by former

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Kwangtung first secretary and Tao Chu associate Chao Tzu-yang, who was rehabilitated in Inner Mongolia and then transferred back to Kwangtung as a secretary early last year. A 5 April Kiangsi broadcast revealed the rehabilitation of Yang Shang-kuei, former Kiangsi party secretary who was purged in the cultural revolution. He was identified as a vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee.

### INTELLECTUALS URGED TO IMPROVE ATTITUDE TO "NEW THINGS"

A subject that has been prominent in recent efforts to combat negation of cultural revolution "new things" has been the question of relations of cadres and intellectuals with the masses. This question figured in Mao's talk to the SHANSI-SUIYUAN DAILY, as reflected in his observation that "intellectuals are often ignorant" and must "go out by turns to take part in mass work." In recent months there has been renewed emphasis on the importance of cadres laboring with the masses, of educated youth going to the countryside, and of taking political factors into account in educational policy. Part of the case against Lin Piao as an "ultraleftist" had been the charge that he led a leftist deviation from Mao's educational line by an excessive and costly emphasis on political requirements at the expense of traditional academic concerns. The current campaign to strike a proper balance between "red" and "expert" has not halted the trend in recent years to rebuild a quality educational system but reflects an effort to retain selected "new things" that emerged on the educational front during the cultural revolution.

The most forthcoming recent call for intellectuals to overcome what is now termed the "ultrarightist" line of Lin was contained in a 15 April Shenyang report on a provincial conference studying ways to rectify the style of work among intellectuals. Liaoning-based Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien headed a full turnout of the province's active party leaders attending the "lively and vigorous" conference of representatives of various scientific, technical, and educational departments throughout Liaoning. Mao Yuan-hsin, who is thought to be Mao's nephew, was among the provincial leaders who spoke.

The conference stressed that only by deepening criticism of "the content and criminal aim" of "swindlers" and gaining a clearer understanding of the "ultrarightist essence" of their line can one keep abreast of the developing situation. In order to develop

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the "achievements" of the cultural revolution and "take an enthusiastic attitude toward the new things of the proletariat," intellectuals were reminded, more pointedly than in the recent past, of the need to integrate their book knowledge with the practical experience of the masses by **going** "deep among the workers and peasants" and to be ready "to stand up to long and even painful training." They were also cautioned to uphold the party's general line and to "oppose conservatism and the world outlook of lazybones and cowards."

In an unusual display of frankness, the conference concluded that although intellectuals had made some progress in changing their worldview during the cultural revolution, greater efforts are still necessary; "the majority of intellectuals uphold socialism and are willing to serve the people, but their world outlook is basically bourgeois." However, in keeping with past policies that intellectuals should be boldly used even if their ideological transformation is not yet complete, the conference encouraged all intellectuals to "have great aspirations and firm determination" and "strive to go on discovering, inventing, creating, and advancing" in order to make contributions to socialist construction.

The carefully selective nature of the current emphasis on developing "newborn things in the educational revolution" was reflected in a 7 April Canton report on the experience of the party committee at Kwangtung Normal College in overcoming "all sorts of resistance" from those who "wanted to crush revolutionary newborn things." In their effort to run the college with the "doors open" and make classroom teaching complementary with teaching at production sites outside the school, the students and teachers at the college were said to have "found that it was impossible, or very difficult, to integrate directly some professional subjects with the actual conditions of local struggles." To help solve this problem, the college party committee organized the teachers and students and led them to realize that "in integrating with reality, we can integrate some subjects directly and others indirectly. For instance, in professional subjects such as classical Chinese language and literature, we do not necessarily have to seek a direct integration." Students within professional disciplines were advised that it is enough to "undertake some social investigation with definite objectives in mind, take part in practice," and "apply the viewpoint of dialectical materialism" to "analyze and study these professional subjects."

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A broadcast from Hunan, Mao's native province, registered a move to reinstate reforms which may have been mistakenly discarded by cadres during the campaign to stress quality education and overcome the effects of Lin's "ultraleftist" line that "politics can oust everything." In commenting on how to correctly handle problems arising from the campaign to rectify the style of work, the broadcast noted that production teams of a local commune had ended the influence of "swindlers" who had suspended political evening schools--an educational reform particularly close to Mao's heart. This was done by following the leadership of the commune's party committee and deepening the workers' ideological study until they realized that "it complies with Chairman Mao's revolutionary line to run political evening schools well and to organize the masses seriously to read books and master Marxism." It was noted that the commune's party committee now "runs well above 6,000 political evening schools in the county."

The balanced character of the current campaign to develop the "achievements" on the educational front brought about by the cultural revolution was clearly illustrated in an 18 March CHEKIANG DAILY editorial stressing that "many revolutionary new things have emerged" and that a new educational system is "gradually being established and consolidated through experiments of various kinds." The editorial said "a contingent of 'red and expert' working class intellectuals is now gradually forming." Branding as incorrect the views of those who "always believe that new things in the revolution are invincible and enthusiastically praise them and pin their hopes on them" as well as the views of those who "one-sidedly exaggerate the defects and shortcomings of new things as they develop," the editorial took a centrist position in arguing that "it is necessary to sum up experiences in good time, actively solve various problems that are unavoidable in the development of new things, and make it possible for them to develop in a healthy manner."

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## ISRAELI RAID ON LEBANON

## USSR SEES TERROR AS HAMPERING PEACEFUL MIDEAST SETTLEMENT

In routine reportage and comment rather than in official statements,\* Moscow promptly denounced the Israeli raid on targets in Beirut and Sidon on the night of 9-10 April and the killing of Palestinian leaders Yusuf an-Najjar, Kamal Nasir, and Kamal 'Adwan. TASS commentator Kornilov on the 10th set the tone for Soviet reaction, as he had following the 21 February raid in Lebanon and the downing of the Libyan plane, by charging that the attack was aimed at intimidating the Arab countries and preventing a relaxation of tension in the Middle East. Along with reportage of indignant reaction in the Arab world and other foreign protests, Moscow publicized on the 11th a message of support to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the host group during 'Arafat's visits to the USSR.

Placing atypical emphasis on the need for good-neighborly relations between Israel and the Arabs, Moscow showed concern that recurring incidents might impel the Arabs to precipitous responses. While sharply criticizing Israel, Moscow sought to strike a balance by recalling "just criticism" of extremist fedayeen elements. And while reiterating stereotyped assertions that Israeli "military provocations" followed U.S. promises of further military and economic aid and replaying charges of U.S. complicity in the Israeli actions, commentators carefully attributed these accusations to Palestinian or other sources, and failed to repeat Palestinian insistence on U.S. embassy involvement in harboring some of the Israeli raiders.

ISSUE OF TERRORISM      Reflecting concern that a continuing cycle of terror and counterterror might lead to general fighting, Kudryavtsev in the 14 April IZVESTIYA asked if Israel hoped to "provoke premature acts" by the Arab states in order to repeat June 1967 and frustrate a peaceful settlement.

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\* Last September Moscow atypically issued a Soviet Government statement in response to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria. Other than a government statement of March 1968 pegged to an attack on Jordan, the usual vehicle for response has been a TASS statement, five of which were issued between November 1968 and May 1970 in connection with Israeli attacks on Arab countries.

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A similar view had been expressed in PRAVDA at the time of the Libyan plane downing. Kudryavtsev also made one of Moscow's infrequent references to the need for good-neighborly relations, maintaining that this was the way to obtain secure frontiers. While he accused Israel of elevating terrorism to the level of state policy, he at the same time voiced an indirect remonstrance against Palestinian terrorism, declaring that a policy of official terror can in no way be justified by "terrorist acts of desperate extremist elements."

In a more even-handed approach, a PRAVDA international review, broadcast in Arabic on the 15th, deplored official Israeli terror but added that "it should be pointed out that the counterterror measures carried out by the Palestinian extremist elements of the Black September organization have received just criticism." While Moscow is on record as disapproving Palestinian "extremist" actions, the dissemination of PRAVDA's criticism to Arab audiences in the aftermath of an Israeli action is particularly noteworthy.

Referring to a possible connection between the Beirut raid and the 9 April incidents in Cyprus, a Moscow domestic service commentary on the 11th noted that some papers such as the French LE FIGARO had made "timid attempts" to present the Israeli action as revenge for "recent terrorist incidents on Cyprus," but that such "vain efforts" were refuted by an Israeli radio commentator who called the Lebanon operation one of the measures worked out long ago to mark Israel's 25th anniversary. Typifying its treatment of previous fedayeen incidents, Moscow had all but ignored the 9 April attempt to hijack an Israeli passenger plane at Nicosia airport and the attack the same day on the residence of the Israeli ambassador in Cyprus. TASS that day briefly reported the incidents with the customary circumlocution, attributing the airline incident to "a group of unidentified persons" and adding that "there was an explosion" at the ambassador's residence and three persons were detained by police. The TASS report was broadcast by Moscow domestic service on the 9th, but PRAVDA, publishing it on the 11th, omitted the reference to the second incident. A Menshikov dispatch from Nicosia in PRAVDA on the 15th reported concern in the Cypriot press that the Israeli-Black September "mutual terrorist activities" might spread to Cyprus and referred cryptically to "incidents" on the island.

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Playing up Palestinian denials, Moscow has reported the Israeli and Palestinian charges and countercharges of responsibility for the attacks which destroyed Tapline oil **storage tanks** in az-Zahrani, southern Lebanon, on the night of 14 April.

**U.S. ROLE** The Korrilov TASS commentary on the 10th made the stereotyped assertion that Israeli "military provocations" followed U.S. promises of further military and economic aid which provided "direct encouragement" of Israel's "expansionist policy" and incitement to new "acts of aggression." This line has been a staple in Soviet comment on the Middle East problem since Israeli Prime Minister Meir's early March visit to the United States and the subsequent reports of new U.S. arms commitments to Israel.

While Moscow has not refrained from taking some propaganda advantage of the PLO charge of U.S. complicity in the Israeli action, it has carefully made attribution to Palestinian or other sources. Against the background of past Soviet accusations of CIA activities worldwide, the treatment in this case seems moderate.\* There was at least one acknowledgment, in IZVESTIYA on the 12th, of the U.S. denial of complicity. TASS, in reporting the Security Council session on the 12th, dealt chiefly with the Lebanese representative's statement and made no mention of U.S. Ambassador Scali's remarks, in which he rebutted the "big lie." TASS on the 18th in further reporting the session noted only that Scali failed to condemn Israel's attack on Lebanon and did not even mention Israel in his speech, but "urged the Security Council not to look for those guilty" of the situation existing in the Middle East.

The first Soviet pickup of the Palestinian charges of U.S. complicity came in a domestic service broadcast on the 11th. The radio's Beirut correspondent, Seyful-Mulyukov, noted that a PLO statement said "secret CIA agents operating on Lebanese territory" had "furnished the Israeli terrorist squads with direct aid." The dispatch claimed it had been "authenticated" that the attack was prepared and carried out by Israel with the

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\* For instance, TASS on 8 April publicized a commentary by Baskakov charging the CIA with "subversive activities" in Indochina, India, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

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"collaboration" of imperialist intelligence agencies, and cited Lebanese reports that the cars used by the Israeli teams had been rented a few days earlier by foreigners with West European passports.

The complicity charge appeared, with qualifications, in Moscow papers on the 12th. IZVESTIYA noted the U.S. denial, in a Koryavin dispatch from Cairo that said any connection with the terrorist acts in Beirut "has been officially denied in Washington," but added that the PLO had charged that "the entire operation was 'coordinated with the CIA.'" (On the 13th, without mentioning the U.S. denial, Koryavin reported in IZVESTIYA that Palestinian representatives in various Arab countries were emphasizing full Israeli-CIA coordination in the attack.) PRAVDA on the 12th published a Beirut dispatch by Orekhov which also reported that the Palestinian resistance leadership had issued a statement accusing the CIA of "allegedly" participating in the preparation of the raid. Orekhov identified the "pseudotourists" who rented the cars as "a group of Israeli agents" who arrived in Beirut as tourists from West Europe.

The charge of CIA participation was also aired in broadcasts in Arabic and by the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa.

SECURITY COUNCIL TASS, in minimal coverage of the Security Council session considering Lebanon's complaint against Israel, reported on the 14th that Soviet delegate Malik had said his delegation was ready to support "efficient sanctions" against Israel, "up to its expulsion" from the United Nations. Moscow has from time to time brought up the question of sanctions, generally in the context of a UN General Assembly or Security Council debate on the Middle East. TASS last December reported Malik as saying in the General Assembly that Israel could not forever abuse the United Nations' patience and sabotage the observance of its decisions and still enjoy the advantages of membership.

According to a Korotkov commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 14th, Malik again raised the matter of "coordinated efforts" by the permanent members of the Security Council to eliminate the "dangerous war area" in the Middle East and expressed readiness to "resume immediately" consultations with the object of providing assistance to Dr. Jarring. Not since February 1972, during a Security Council meeting dealing with an Israeli attack on Lebanon, had Malik been reported by Soviet media as "appealing again" to the permanent members to resume consultations.

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## PRC CHARGES "SUPERPOWERS" AID ISRAEL WITH WEAPONS. MANPOWER

Peking reacted to the Israeli raid in Lebanon on 9-10 April with a show of solidarity with the Palestinians and other Arabs. The most authoritative comment was a **PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator** article on the 12th which placed equal blame on the Soviet Union and the United States for supporting Israel. Along with publicity for a press conference held by the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization mission in Peking, NCNA reported that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ho Ying and other PRC officials had called on the PLO mission to express condolences on the death of the three Palestinian leaders killed in Beirut. NCNA reported from Beirut, in an item datelined the 12th, that the PRC charge d'affaires in Lebanon had called on PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat to express sympathy;\* on the 14th, the charge called at the Lebanese foreign ministry to express support for Lebanon in its "struggle against Israeli aggression and for safeguarding national sovereignty."

The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article charged the "superpowers" with support and encouragement which have "made the Zionists so arrogant," reiterating previous propaganda assertions that "one superpower" supplies a flow of money and weapons to Israel while "the other superpower incessantly provides it with massive manpower and sources for troop recruitment, and even technical specialists, in the form of emigrants." NCNA has disseminated recent Arab press complaints about the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and on 31 March even cited the article by "Soviet special agent" Victor Louis in the Israeli paper **YEDIOT AHARONOT** disclosing that the USSR recently suspended the levy of exit fees on Soviet Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union "in order to expedite their emigration to Israel." The Soviet move, NCNA said, had aroused "strong resentment and opposition" in the Arab world.

PEOPLE'S DAILY seemed to rebuke Arab governments seeking to control the activities of the fedayeen and also to hint that the Palestinians should confine their operations to the Middle East. Commentator thus called it "entirely just" for the Palestinian people to fight "on other Arab territories" for the restoration of their national rights "with the support of other fraternal Arab people."

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\* The clandestine Voice of Palestine and the Baghdad Voice of Palestine--but not Soviet media--reported on 11 April that Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon Azimov had contacted Yasir 'Arafat to convey the Soviet Government's condolences on the death of the three Palestinian leaders.

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## U. S. - U S S R

### MOSCOW EVINCES OPTIMISM ABOUT IMPROVED BILATERAL TIES

Referring routinely now to the onset of a "new stage" in U.S.-Soviet relations, Moscow has seemed less **reluctant in recent weeks** to increase its public commitment to a policy of closer cooperation with the United States, particularly in the fields of trade, science and technology, and space exploration. Expanded treatment of prospects for cooperation in these areas has been evident in both domestic and international press and radio comment.\* At the same time, in the most recent authoritative in-depth commentaries on U.S.-Soviet relations on record, in February and March, Moscow has continued to hedge somewhat on the future, citing trade and economic relations as the area in which normalization faces its most immediate test and pointing to the continuing "serious dangers" to normalization in the field of strategic arms control.

**BILATERAL COOPERATION** Comment in Soviet media in recent weeks has been noticeably less hesitant in acknowledging that U.S.-Soviet relations are in a period of fundamental change. Though the **standard uncomplimentary** treatment of U.S. domestic problems has continued, it has been balanced by expanded coverage of favorable developments in U.S.-Soviet relations. The central press in the second half of 1972 had given only sporadic coverage to the implementation of the agreements reached at the May summit on expanded trade and economic relations and on cooperation in space, environmental protection, and science and technology. But a shift of emphasis in recent weeks is evident in a new focus on potential areas of mutually profitable cooperation. By far the bulk of the attention has been devoted to optimistic appraisals of prospects for trade and economic relations. The press has also widely publicized the first joint venture under the space cooperation agreement and the recent series of meetings between U.S. and Soviet technical experts on cooperation in pollution abatement, health, and science and technology. In addition to analysis by regular press and radio commentators, a large place in the expanded

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\* For a review of comment earlier in the year see the TRENDS of 28 February 1973, pages 21-24, "Moscow Appears Cautious on Relations with U.S., Eyes Trade."

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coverage has been devoted to articles by, and interviews of, Soviet government and scientific personnel involved in the cooperative efforts.

The favorable publicity for U.S.-Soviet cooperative ventures, **projecting confidence** in an extended period of closer U.S.-Soviet relations, has been directed at a wide span of domestic and foreign audiences in a **publicity effort that may be** designed in part with the prospect of a Brezhnev visit to the United States in view. Commentaries on Soviet-U.S. cooperation have recently appeared not only in the central press but in the provincial and specialized press organs as well as in domestic and international radio broadcasts. These commentaries have emphasized that expanded cooperation would have a beneficial effect on the political dimension of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. In this context, Brezhnev's observation at the USSR's 50th Anniversary celebrations last December that expanded economic cooperation could "help to improve the political climate in Soviet-American relations" has been cited repeatedly. The importance of residual domestic U.S. opposition to expanded cooperation with the USSR has been generally discounted. The stress instead has been on the importance of the positive attitude of Administration officials and the vast majority of U.S. businessmen.

Trade and economic relations have been portrayed as an area in which improved political relations might have a most important and immediate impact. In this context, the significance of domestic U.S. opposition to most-favored-nation status for the USSR has been played down. Instead, the recent agreement on long-term credits signed in Washington and the major contract on agricultural chemicals signed with Occidental Petroleum have been cited as important stages in the fulfillment of the promises that emerged from the Moscow summit and the October agreements on trade.

Moscow has shown sensitivity to an assertion by some U.S. spokesmen that the benefits of expanded cooperation, particularly in the field of trade and economic relations, would accrue primarily to the USSR. Pointing out that the United States and the USSR, as the world's "leading economies," are natural trading partners, commentators have quoted U.S. sources in listing a number of specific areas in science, trade, and industrial technology where the United States itself has much to gain.

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REMAINING OBSTACLES      The more careful and comprehensive analyses of U.S.-Soviet relations after Vietnam that have accompanied these developments have shown some caution in discussing the future. U.S. Institute head Georgiy Arbatov, in KOMMUNIST No. 3 signed to press on 19 February, and K. M. Georgiyev and M. O. Kolosov, in the March 1973 issue of the Journal USA, emphasized the considerable distance yet to be traveled on the road to normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Arbatov, enumerating domestic and international developments that have brought realism to the fore in U.S. policy, conceded that the significance of the changes to date--and their durability--should not be underestimated. But he warned of "serious dangers" remaining due to the continued prominence of those who consider U.S.-Soviet relations a confrontation in which a gain for one means a loss for the other. Arbatov expressed concern particularly over U.S. attitudes toward further limitations on strategic arms. In his immediate post-summit analysis last summer he had praised the SALT agreements negotiated by the Administration while directing his criticism toward domestic opponents of the agreements and of the overall normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations. In the KOMMUNIST article he shows more concern about official attitudes; he complains about the persistence of cold war approaches not only among those clearly and openly opposed to detente but "even in several aspects of official policy" such as Administration requests for increased military appropriations.

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G D R - U S S R - F R G

# BREZHNEV BONN VISIT PROVOKES IRRITATION IN GDR

Recent comments by members of the GDR leadership reveal persistent footdragging on the policy of rapprochement with West Germany as public attention to the forthcoming ratification of the FRG-GDR treaty intensifies in connection with Brezhnev's projected visit to Bonn. While scattered, low-level East German comment has generally hailed the forthcoming visit as a contribution to European detente, a number of high-level spokesmen have demonstrated dissatisfaction with the current line by reiterating uncompromising views on the nature of the future West German-East German relationship--issues that had been carefully bypassed in the FRG-GDR treaty--or by otherwise expressing their irritation over the proposed visit. The official SED organ, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, in the meantime, has gone to unusual lengths to demonstrate an accommodating attitude toward the FRG, suggesting the possibility that the Soviet Union has applied pressure to insure a more favorable atmosphere for Brezhnev's presence in Bonn.

By far the most striking illustration of high-level dissatisfaction with the current trends in policy was provided by Kurt Winzer, veteran GDR Foreign Minister, in an interview on Vienna radio on 11 April. Asked if he saw any connection between Brezhnev's forthcoming visit and relations between the GDR and the FRG, Winzer curtly replied:

I am not acting here as the spokesman for Mr. Brezhnev. I am the foreign minister of the GDR. If you have questions to ask Mr. Brezhnev, please turn to him and not to me. There are relations between the GDR and the FRG which are subject solely to the sovereign decisions of the two states and to nothing else.

Both ADN and East Berlin radio reports of the 11th and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND of the 12th noted Winzer's Vienna radio interview but did not describe its substance. Winzer was in Vienna 10-16 April at the invitation of the Austrian Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations to deliver a lecture on GDR foreign policy.

The irritability expressed in Winzer's remarks is given added significance by the fact that he studiously avoided any mention of the upcoming Brezhnev visit in his other public statements in Vienna. For example, in the excerpts of an interview which he "authorized" for showing on Vienna television on the 12th, he included segments

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In which he adamantly rejected the Bonn concept of a "united German nation," but none which referred to the Brezhnev visit.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Further perspective on the significance of the Winzer performance is afforded by the contrasting attitude which the party's central organ, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, demonstrated toward the FRG the preceding week. On 5 April, it published the complete text of an interview by Horst Grabert, of the FRG Chancellor's office, in which he made the standard Bonn declaration--which the GDR considers highly provocative--that the FRG cannot consider the GDR as a "foreign country." The interview, published the previous day in the West Berlin BERLINER MORGENPOST, contained certain Bonn viewpoints on West-East German relations considered acceptable by the GDR; but for NEUES DEUTSCHLAND to reprint the interview without any prefatory editorial comment and to include in it the following question-answer passage was "unprecedented"--and so described by Bonn spokesman von Wechmar on the 6th:

Question: Will the federal president be included in the [FRG-GDR treaty] ratification process and can the GDR then conclude from such participation that there is a "foreign countries' relationship" between the two states?

Grabert: We have made clear everywhere that to us the GDR cannot be a foreign country. We will continue to act in accordance with this position.

In publishing this passage in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the party leadership has in effect made a unique concession to the spirit as well as the letter of the current bloc policy regarding Germany. It may have done so under Soviet pressure. In any event, it is probably significant that the Grabert interview came on the heels of a spate of authoritative statements by ideologues in the GDR leadership denouncing the Brandt concept of "one German nation." SED Politburo member, Axen, Hager, and Norden on 7, 15, and 19 March, respectively, all made statements denying the concept of "one" German nation and insisting that there is the "socialist" nation of the GDR and the "capitalist" FRG, that these states are sovereign, and that they are irreconcilable on the basis of class concepts. Winzer reiterated these points in his long Vienna television interview of the 12th, and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, in reporting it the following day, cited that passage where Winzer declared there is no longer a "united German nation."

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA - FRG

### BONN COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCES AGREEMENT ON TREATY TALKS

The Bonn-Prague announcement on 13 April that "exploratory" talks on normalization of relations between the two countries had been completed and that "official" negotiations on a treaty would soon begin appears to set the stage for an early resolution of the last major outstanding issue that could mar Brezhnev's visit to the FRG. The public confirmation of the impending visit may well have helped bring to a head the accommodation for which Czechoslovakia has paved the way by relaxing its long-standing insistence that the FRG acknowledge the invalidity of the 1938 Munich pact "ab initio." Although West Germany grants that the Munich agreement has been null and void since Hitler violated it by occupying the western regions of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, it has been reluctant to extend this nullification to the initial period from September 1938 to March 1939, for fear--among other things--of jeopardizing the legal rights of German citizens who resided in the Sudetenland at that time.

The brief joint communique on the 12-13 April talks in Bonn, as broadcast by the Prague radio, said the two sides agreed "to recommend to their governments the start of official talks on a treaty." The principals at this session were the same as at the previous session in Prague last June--Jiri Goetz, Czechoslovak deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Paul Frank, state secretary of the West German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The communique contrasts with the uninformative announcement at the end of the previous session that the two sides had "decided to inform their respective governments on the results of the talks held so far." The nine-month period since those talks has been marked by the gradual disappearance of the phrase "ab initio" from the public demands by Prague and Moscow that Bonn acknowledge the illegality of the Munich accord. Thus, two days before the opening of the sixth and last session of the exploratory talks in Bonn, TASS on the 10th reported CSSR Foreign Minister Chnoupek as stating, in an interview with the Soviet weekly LITERARY GAZETTE, that "we hope the FRG will show understanding of the need to recognize the Munich diktat as invalid and illegal."

An impression that movement toward conclusion of an FRG-Czechoslovak treaty would be fairly rapid was conveyed by a 16 April Prague TV interview of Goetz following his return from the talks in Bonn. After reporting

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that "we have jointly found a common platform" on the issue of the Munich pact. Goetz said it was "possible" that Frank would come to Prague in the first 10 days in May and that he himself would go back to Bonn at the end of the month. By that time, he added, the treaty would be "ready for initialing, I would say, some time in the middle of June or possibly at the end of June"--that is, before the opening of the European security conference. He predicted that Foreign Minister Chnoupek might go to Bonn to initial the treaty, opening up a possibility--noted by DER SPIEGEL on the 16th--that Chancellor Brandt could go to Prague for the actual signing of the pact. Both TASS and the Prague radio on the 14th reported Chancellor Brandt as telling the SPD congress that as a result of the Bonn talks, "we can now begin official talks with Prague" and that "the good-neighborly relations by which European reality is beginning to be characterized must become a fact in this case as well."

FOLLOWUP COMMENT      In the wake of the latest, apparently successful talks in Bonn, Moscow has refrained from extensive comment but has publicized Prague's favorable assessment, including remarks by Kusak in Bratislava on the 15th. Warsaw and Sofia have commented at some length, hewing largely to their standard positions on the developing detente with West Germany. Thus PAP's commentator on the 13th was optimistic on the start of Bonn-Prague treaty negotiations "in the immediate future" and predicted that the already-signed East German-West German treaty would be ratified "soon." He added that, "in further prospect," he expected the establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Hungary and Bulgaria.

The Bulgarians themselves were less explicit, RABOTNICHESKO DELO commenting on the 14th that the "problem" of working out differences with the FRG "is not solely a Czechoslovak one," but "affects also the other socialist countries" which want lasting peaceful relations with "all West European states, the FRG included." The Sofia paper took a harder line than current Czechoslovak comment in remarking that the Munich pact issue had not been solved up to now because none of the previous West German governments viewed the pact "in a fair way" and because Britain, unlike Italy and France, "refuses to this day to remove Chamberlain's signature" from the document.

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## CPSU SLOGANS

### MAY DAY SLOGANS DEEMPHASIZE CONTENTIOUS WORLD ISSUES

The CPSU Central Committee's May Day slogans for 1973, published in the central press on 15 April, reflect Moscow's satisfaction with recent international developments, the Vietnam peace agreement in particular, as well as its emphasis on a policy of normalizing relations with the West. At the same time, by de-emphasizing specific contentious issues, the slogans carry forward the trend toward moderation that has been evident in the foreign-affairs section of these semiannual statements in recent years. The trend dates from the slogans issued for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967, when the foreign-affairs section was considerably shortened and references to individual countries were deleted except for the world's major trouble spots. Also in line with recent practice, the current slogans avoid contentious issues in international communist relations.

The most obvious and predictable change this time reflects the Vietnam peace agreement. Greetings to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and demands for an end to U.S. involvement are replaced by a salute to the Vietnamese alone, hailing their "historic" victory. The slogan calls for "peace, freedom, and independence to all the peoples of Indochina" but nowhere mentions Laos or Cambodia specifically.

Slogans on the Middle East and the third world as well as the greeting to the workers in capitalist countries also substitute briefer and less specific language for that used in previous versions:

+ The stock demand for withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territory, present in the slogan on the Middle East since May Day 1968, is replaced by the less explicit but equally stereotyped call for "elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression." A demand for "respect for the rights of the Palestinian Arab people" is dropped from the slogan after a single appearance last October, although it continues to be voiced in routine Soviet comment.

+ The slogan on the international workers movement is considerably shortened and moderated. Only "fraternal greetings" to the working class of capitalist countries remains in the place of previous references to the struggle of the working class against monopoly capital domestically and imperialism internationally.

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## U S S R

## LIBERAL ECONOMIST BIRMAN CONTINUES TO DEFY ORTHODOXY

The liberal economist Aleksandr Birman, who has continued to defend the 1965 economic reform in the face of growing official disenchantment over its results, has again defied convention by advocating worker participation in economic decision-making as a new and higher form of incentive. Though clearly out of official favor in recent years, Birman has managed to retain a podium mainly in literary publications rather than in party and economic journals.

Advancing his proposal in the March issue of FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES, a low-circulation literary journal, Birman took issue not only with those favoring administrative methods of management over economic methods but also with those seeking to improve management by devising new techniques of decision-making, new methods of information control, and new forms of organization. The ideas of the latter school of economic thought have been ascendant since the December 1969 CPSU plenum and were embodied most recently in the decision to reorganize Soviet industry into a system of production associations.

In support of his unorthodox proposal, Birman cited Lenin on the importance of offering workers the opportunity of "actually administering public production independently." He argued that the desire of workers for such participation is so strong that even under capitalism plant owners have had to improvise new forms of participation for engineers and technicians, and he recommended that this force be better exploited under socialism. Though short on concrete means of implementing his proposal, Birman pointed to the volunteer "nonstaff" departments in local Soviet executive committees as a promising trend that has not been studied adequately.

Also appearing to buck the current emphasis on training professional administrators, Birman warned against the development of "managerism"--the emergence of a managerial class distinct from the workers--and urged that ways and means be found for the use of economic methods of management not just by professional administrators and economists but by "tens of millions of workers" as well.

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